Can Functionalism Explain Social Affairs?
Since the sixties functional analysis is in retreat in the social sciences, but not so in biology. From its very beginning, sociology has struggled with the question what a functional explanation is, and whether it applies also to social affairs. The first question one has to deal with is whether functional explanantion is just a form of causal explanation, or whether it stands alone. For the purposes of this Logi, I assume with Anthony Giddens (1996; original 1976) that all functional explanantions can be rendered as “functional effects”, which are therefore simply types of causal explanation. This equation is certainly not accepted by all functionalist sociologists, most notably not by Niklas Luhmann, but that would be a different discussion. If we say that functional explanantion is a form or type of causal explanation, what then makes it different? According to Giddens, there are two options: 1) By way of assuming needs of a social system. A phenomenon is functional when it contrib
