Did Legislature Exceed Its Constitutional Authority by Restricting Common Law ‘Intentional Tort’ Claims?
Rose Kiminski [sic] v. Metal & Wire Products Company et al., Case no. 2008-0857 7th District Court of Appeals (Columbiana County) ISSUE: Did the General Assembly exceed its authority under the Ohio Constitution by enacting a statute that imposes a standard of proof for “intentional tort” lawsuits by injured workers against their employers that is more restrictive than the common law standard of proof for such claims established by decisions of the Supreme Court? BACKGROUND: Effective April 7, 2005, the General Assembly adopted R.C. 2745.01, which codified a “workplace intentional tort” cause of action that had previously been recognized by a line of Supreme Court of Ohio decisions dating back to 1982. (See background discussion above in the preview of Case No. 2008-0894, Klaus v. United Equity, Inc). In a subsection of the 2005 statute, R.C. 2745.01(B), the legislature required that in order to establish the common law requirement that his employer was aware that a known safety hazard
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