Does lobbying work in developing countries? Is it more effective than corruption?
It is difficult to assess whether lobbying, for example, contributes to the strengthening of democratic institutions or whether it helps further political stability (Coates, Heckelman and Wilson, 2007, provide evidence that the number of trade associations, as a proxy for lobbying activity, is systematically higher in democracies.) Although these are benefits normally associated with interest group activity, they are in practice difficult to measure. On the other hand, in recent research co-authored with Francesco Giovannoni, I examine whether and how extensively lobbying affects the political decision-making process (vis-à-vis corruption) and also whether firms benefit economically from membership in such associations. Our analysis (Campos and Giovannoni 2007) focuses on two main questions: • What are the factors that determine the likelihood of a firm being a member of a lobby group? • What is the relative role of corruption and lobbying in explaining the probability of a firm being