How Effective Are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions?
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As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under “Related research” (further below) or search for a different version of it. Publisher InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7541. Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF Length: Date of creation: Nov 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7541 Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53–56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG Phone: 44 – 20 – 7183 8801 Fax: 44 – 20 – 7183 8820 Order Information: Email: liame2(‘org’,’cepr’,’m7i7′,’orders’) For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: liame2(‘org’,’cepr’,’m7i7′,’repec’) (). Related researchKeywords: Benefit sanctions; competing-risk duration models; earnings effects; unemployment duration; Find
[Also available as: CEPR DP 7541, IFAU WP 09:22, CentER DP 09:80] This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duratio
Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a b
