Is the notion of “distinctive human function” foundational for Aquinas?
One line of understanding is exemplified by the section on “moral doctrine” in McInerny and O’Callaghan 2005. It gives a priority to Aristotle’s arguments attempting to identify a “distinctive” or “peculiarly human” function,” arguments which proceed on the postulate that, if each kind of craft has its own characteristic function and mode of operation, so must human life as a whole have an “overall” and “distinctively characteristic” function and operatio; and the determination of this should decisively shape the whole of (the rest of) ethics and political theory. To this standard interpretation other interpreters, such as Grisez, Finnis, and Rhonheimer, object on grounds such as these: (i) Aquinas’ austerely self-disciplined purposes as an Aristotelian commentator make quite insecure any assumption that he treats as fundamental to his own thinking any and every proposition which is treated by Aristotle as fundamental and expounded in Aquinas’ relevant commentary without adverse commen
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- Is the notion of "distinctive human function" foundational for Aquinas?