What made the M3 Half track Tank Destroyer a Failure?
It’s biggest failure had little to nothing to do with the equipment. Its failure was more about tactics and training which lead to deployment and employment of the tank destroyer crews. Most decisions surrounding the failure of the Destroyer were formed during the Louisianna Maneuvers and sadly, most of the upper echelons were old, incompetent and soon to be relieved. After they were relieved, the Army was reconfigured from a box formation to a triangle. Of those cut from the box, the Tank Destroyer Crews were very near the top of that list. Those men were duly reassigned to help create more divisions. Men who tested high in academia, were funneled into the Army Air Corps. Those who scored lowest, were sent to the infantry.
The M3 GMC half-track tank destroyers ONLY existed for a simple reason – lack of anything, and I mean anything more suitable. The big problems were: 1. Fundamentally flawed doctrine for employment. 2. Barely adequate gun. Even by the standards of late 1942 the M1897 field gun was not an anti-tank gun. 3. Inadequate mobility for the TD role. 4. Armor protection that bordered on the non-existant. The museum just down the road from my house has the hulks of several M3 half-tracks laying about in their yard that they are in the process of assembling into one complete vehicle. Examining those body shells up close it becomes clear how incredibly thin that metal is. At short range this will not stop rifle/MG ball ammo. For example, at El Guettar in March 1943 the 601st TD Battalion lost 20 of its 28 M3 GMC’s fighting off 50 tanks of the 10th Panzer Division. By comparison the 899th TD Battalion which fought alongside the 601st lost just 7 of its M10’s. Combined these two battalions managed to
