Why does PFS seem to feel that sabotage is not a credible possibility during the transportation process, including the intermodal transfer point?
Experts agree that spent fuel rods are an unattractive target for terrorists for several reasons: First, a transportation cask will weigh 75 – 100 tons, and would require special equipment to handle it. It is not something that could be put in the back of a pickup truck and carried off. Second, the fuel inside cannot be used to make a bomb without a sophisticated reprocessing plant. Third, anyone attempting to penetrate the thick steel cask risks personal exposure and harm from radiation. Fourth, casks used to transport spent fuel have been tested and proven to withstand severe accidents or incidents, including bomb blasts. Finally, the potential damage that could be postulated from a breach in a cask, would be relatively minor compared with the damage that terrorists could cause for non-nuclear “targets” or by using other terrorist “tools,” such as chemical or biological agents.
