Does Canada contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation?
) Safeguards are one aspect of a general consideration of the proliferation risk of reactor-grade plutonium. One must also be concerned with the details of acquisition, manufacturing, tactical and strategic usefulness on both a national and subnational level, as well as technical viability. Although this document will deal mainly with the latter issue – technical viability – it will touch on the “grander” issue of proliferation risk as well. EXPLOSIVE POTENTIAL OF REACTOR-GRADE PLUTONIUM Suppose for the moment, however, that someone were able to steal or divert enough spent fuel to make a critical mass with the enclosed reactor-grade plutonium. At approximately 80 g of plutonium per discharged CANDU fuel bundle [19], and assuming a reactor-grade critical mass (with effective neutron reflection) of 8 kg [3], this would require 100 spent fuel bundles, weighing two tonnes without shielding. Not only would the theft be extremely difficult, but since it would also be easily and quickly dete
