Confidentiality could not be a concern in the vast majority of precincts that have even minimal demographic diversity. Why not release precinct identification for these data?
• In those few precincts where some individual identification might conceivably be possible, NEP could simply have blurred the demographic data. Indeed, given the choice between precinct identifiers – critical to the investigation of fraud — and demographic data, not only is the relative importance plain as day, but demographic data make no sense at all. After all, what is the point of trying to explain why voters purportedly voted as they did, when we cannot even say how they voted? • Finally, consider that NEP denied this data to highly qualified and experienced independent academics from the nation’s leading research institutions, many of whom have experience working with sensitive and national security data, who offered to work only onsite and reimburse NEP for any additional costs incurred. Yet they have given it to two individuals whose only qualifications seem to be an ability to promote the Mitofsky perspective. • Elizabeth Liddle, a British doctoral student in an unrelated fi
Related Questions
- If an employee signed a confidentiality agreement, can they release information the company feels is proprietary during an unemployment insurance eligibility review or hearing?
- Can a convicted DUI offender revoke his/her confidentiality release at will?
- Who prepares the official demographic enrollment and diversity projections?
