Who hedges more when leverage is endogenous?
) Klaus Röder Abstract This paper develops a theory of a firm’s hedging decision with endogenous leverage. In contrast to previous models in the literature, our framework is based on less restrictive distributional assumptions and allows a closed-form analytical solution to the joint optimization problem. Using anecdotal evidence of greater benefits of risk management for firms selling “credence goods” or products that involve long-term relationships, we prove that those optimally leveraged firms, which face more convex indirect bankruptcy cost functions, will choose higher hedge ratios. Moreover, we suggest a new approach to test this relationship empirically. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007 Download InfoTo download: If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these file
